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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
cause of action.28 However, the civilian concept of cause of ac-
tion is much more restricted, and the object of the suit would
not coincide with the cause of action. 29 The allegedly inexact
date in the first suit, the grounds for the allegation that de-
ceased died intestate in the second suit, and the allegation that
deceased could not have possibly signed the will due to his ab-
sence from the state in the present suit would constitute dif-
ferent causes under the civil law. 0 Therefore, invalidity of the
will would have been only the object of the suit and nothing
more.
It is suggested that the civil law concepts of cause of action
and res judicata should preclude the general applicability of the
"might have been pleaded" maxim in Louisiana. Although public
policy requires that litigation have an end, res judicata should
not be applied unless there is present a thing adjudged, accord-
ing to the requisites of Article 2286. Furthermore, the holding in
the instant case appears to undo much of the good work of Hope
v. Madison and the several cases following it.31 It is suggested
that an adherence to the civilian concepts of cause of action and
res judicata as expressed in the above case and the dissent in the
present case would alleviate the confusion resulting from the co-
existence of two discordant lines of authority.
Burrell J. Carter
SALES - AUTOMOBILES - BONA FIDE PURCHASER DOCTRINE
Plaintiff, an Alabama automobile dealer, agreed to sell an
automobile to a Louisiana used car dealer for cash on delivery.
Plaintiff's agent was instructed to deliver the car to New Or-
leans and to accept only cash in payment. When the agent de-
livered the car, however, he accepted a draft. The agent returned
to Alabama and delivered the draft to plaintiff who made no
effort to annul the sale or to secure the return of the car, but
kept the draft for several days and then deposited it for collec-
tion. In the meantime, the used car dealer sold the automobile to
defendant, a good faith purchaser. The draft was dishonored,
28. See note 4 supra.
29. Hope v. Madison, 194 La. 337, 193 So. 666 (1940). See note 14 8upra.
See also Comment, 2 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 347, 491 (1940).
30. See note 29 supra. They would, however, be reasons according to the com-
mon law concept of cause of action.
31. E.g., Leadman v. First Nat. Bank, 198 La. 466, 3 So.2d 739 (1941)
Lloveras v. Reichert, 197 La. 49, 200 So. 817 (1941).
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NOTES
and a criminal action was brought against the used car dealer,
which resulted in his conviction of theft. Plaintiff brought this
suit to recover the automobile from defendant on the ground
that under Article 67 of the Louisiana Criminal Code the original
transaction amounted to theft and no title passed either to the
used car dealer or to defendantt The district court rendered
judgment for plaintiff. On appeal to the Supreme Court, held,
reversed. Failure to repudiate the payment by draft and the
subsequent deposit of the draft for collection constituted a ratifi-
cation of the agent's unauthorized act. This ratification con-
verted the transaction into a credit sale, thus giving title to the
used car dealer and hence to the good faith third party pur-
chaser. The statutory definition of theft is part of the substan-
tive criminal law and does not alter the provisions of the Civil
Code applicable to a civil action. Jeffrey Motor Co. v. Higgins,
230 La. 857, 89 So.2d 369 (1956).
Under the provisions of both the French' and the Louisiana 2
Civil Codes, there is a general rule that the sale of a thing be-
longing to another is null. The French Civil Code contains a
further provision under which the possessor of movables which
are not lost or stolen is considered as the owner and may pass
a valid title to a purchaser. 3 This doctrine of la possession vaut
titre was not incorporated into the Louisiana Civil Code and has
been rejected by the Louisiana courts in cases where its applica-
tion has been urged.4 The Louisiana Civil Code provides that
movables which are not lost or stolen may be acquired by the
prescription of three years5 when possessed by just title6 and in
good faith. 7 All movables may be acquired by the bad faith pre-
scription of ten years.8 Although an owner can recover lost or
stolen movables before they have been acquired by ten years
bad faith prescription, 9 one who purchases the lost or stolen mov-
ables at public auction or from one in the habit of selling such
things is entitled to reimbursement of the purchase price 0 after
he has possessed the movable for three years." To afford addi-
1. FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 1599.
2. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2452 (1870).
3. FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 2279.
4. Holton v. Hubbard, 49 La. Ann. 715, 22 So. 338 (1897) Holloway v.
Ingersoll Co., 133 So. 819 (La. App. 1931).
5. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3506 (1870).
6. Id. arts. 3483-3486.
7. Id. art. 3451.
8. Id. art. 3509.
9. Davis v. Hampton, 4 Mart. (N.S.) 288 (La. 1826).
10. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3507 (1870).
11. Security Sales Co. v. Blackwell, 167 La. 667, 120 So. 45 (1928).
1957]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. XVII
tional protection to the good faith purchaser of movable prop-
erty, the Louisiana courts adopted the common law bona fide
purchaser doctrine.1 2 Under this doctrine, a purchaser in good
faith for value acquires a valid title to a movable if his vendor
has a voidable title. 13 One holds by a voidable title,1 4 if he ac-
quired the movable through fraud 5 or other vice of consent,1 6
but a thief or finder has no title and can convey none.' 7 Despite
the incorporation of the bona fide purchaser doctrine into Lou-
isiana jurisprudence, the good faith purchaser was largely de-
prived of the protection in one recent Louisiana case which ap-
plied the statutory definition of theft 8 in a civil suit to deter-
mine the character of possession which is obtained when a per-
son acquires a movable by fraud. 9 Under the broad scope of this
statute, movables obtained through fraud are deemed to be
stolen, and hence a transferee from the defrauder could not ob-
tain a valid title.20
The instant case repudiates the application of the statutory
definition of theft in a civil suit and thus removes the obstacle
to the full utilization of the bona fide purchaser doctrine in Lou-
isiana.
12. Thomas v. Mead, 8 Mart.(N.S.) 341 (La. 1829).
13. Wilson v. Commercial Finance Co., 239 N.C. 349, 79 S.E.2d 908 (1954)
Handley Motor Co. v. Wood, 238 N.C. 468, 78 S.E.2d 391 (1953).
14. Owens v. Cocroft, 14 Ga. App. 322, 80 S.E. 906 (1914) ; Gross, Kelly &
Co. v. Bibo, 19 N.M. 495, 145 Pac. 480 (1914).
15. Baehr v. Clark, 83 Iowa 313, 49 N.W. 840 (1891). In determining
whether one who obtains a movable by fraud receives a voidable title or receives
no title at all, the common law draws a distinction between a face to face trans-
action and a transaction by which the fraud is perpetrated by mail. 3 CORBIN,
CONTRACTS § 602 (1951). In the face to face transaction, the defrauder obtains
a voidable title (Edmunds v. Merchants' Despatch Transp. Co., 135 Mass. 283
(1.883)), whereas in the transaction conducted by mail, the defrauder obtains no
title. Smith v. Merchants & Traders' Bank, 6 La. Ann. 610 (1851). The ex-
planation given for this doctrine is that in the face to face situation the owner
intends to transfer title to the individual with whom he is dealing, although there
is a mistake as to the name, credit, and character of the person perpetrating the
fraud. In the mail transaction, however, the owner intends to transfer title to the
type of person with whom he thinks he is dealing, and not to the defrauder. 3
CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 602 (1951).
16. In cases containing vices of consent, the former owner may attack the sale
and recover the movable if it has not been transferred to a good faith third party.
Richmond v. Mississippi Mills, 52 Ark. 30, 11 S.W. 960 (1889). See Cardone v.
Consolidated Edison Co., 89 N.Y.S.2d 845 (Mun. Ct. 1949), where the vice of
consent was error; Callendar Savings Bank v. Loos, 142 Iowa 1, 120 N.W. 317
(1909), where the vice of consent was duress.
17. Alexander v. Busch, 66 Okla. 17, 166 Pac. 900 (1917).
18. LA. R.S. 14:67 (1950): "Theft is the misappropriation or taking of any-
thing of value which belongs to another, either without the consent of the other
to the misappropriation or taking, or by means of fradudulent conduct, practices
or representations. An intent to deprive the other permanently of whatever may
be the subject of the misappropriation or taking is essential .. .
19. Port Finance Co. v. Ber, 45 So.2d 404 (La. App. 1950).
20. Packard Florida Motors v. Malone, 208 La. 1058, 24 So.2d 75 (1945).
NOTES
The draftsmen of the Civil Code of 1808 clearly intended to
reject the French doctrine of la possession vaut titre.21 It might
be argued that the draftsmen intended the prescription of three
years to be the sole measure of protection afforded the good faith
purchaser. However, while it is clear that this prescriptive
period applies to the case where the good faith purchaser ac-
quires the movable from one who has no title, it may be ques-
tioned whether this provision is intended to apply to the case
where the good faith purchaser acquires the movable from a
vendor who has a voidable title. Article 1881, which provides
that contracts made through error, fraud, or other vice of con-
sent are not null, but are voidable by the parties, has been inter-
preted to mean that a good faith third party purchaser is pro-
tected where his vendor has a voidable title.22 The question might
be raised whether to this extent the Louisiana Civil Code is con-
sistent with the common law bona fide purchaser doctrine. How-
ever this may be, it is clear today that the common law bona fide
purchaser doctrine is well entrenched in Louisiana law.
T. Wilson Landry
TORTS - ESCAPING PRISONERS - DUTY OF STATE TO THIRD
PERSONS
In the first of two recent cases' a fifteen-year-old inmate had
escaped from a state reformatory. Following his escape, he stole
an automobile which he negligently drove onto a public sidewalk,
injuring plaintiff. Plaintiff charged the state with negligence
in allowing the escape; but defendant's exception of no cause of
action was sustained by the district court. On appeal, held, af-
firmed. The institution's duty to restrain a convicted criminal
is not based on the purpose of protecting the general public from
all harms that might be inflicted by an escaping prisoner, and the
injury received was not one against which the state had a duty
to protect. The court bolstered its opinion by finding that the
acts of defendant in permitting the escape were not the proxi-
mate cause of plaintiff's injury. Green v. State, 91 So.2d 153
(La. App. 1956).
21. This intention is evidenced by the fact that the draftsmen adopted the
French Civil Code articles which immediately precede and follow the French
article establishing this doctrine (Article 2279), but omitted the latter article.
22. Gonsoulin v. Sparrow, 150 La. 103, 90 So. 528 (1921), a case involving
immovable property.
1. In both these cases the state allowed itself to be sued pursuant to LA. CONST.
art. III, § 35.
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